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ABSTRACT 
Elected officials in the United States appear to represent 
relatively extreme support coalitions rather than the interests of 
middle-of-the-road voters. This contention is supported by analysis of 
variance of liberal-conservative positions in the United States Senate 
from 1959 to 1980. Within both the Democratic and the Republican 
parties, there is considerable variation in liberal-conservative 
positions, but two senators from the same state and party tend to be 
very similar. In contrast, two senators from the same state but from 
different parties are highly dissimilar, suggesting that each party 
represents an extreme support coalition in the state. Moreover, the 
distribution of senators is now consistent with the hypothesis that, in 
the long run, both parties are equally likely to win any seat in the 
Senate. This result suggests that there is now competition between 
equally balanced but extreme support coalitions throughout most of the 
United States. 
THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS* 
Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
We contend that, at nearly every level of the political system, 
American politics has been polarized in ways that do not well represent 
the interests of middle-of-the-road voters. For better or for worse, 
constituencies are generally fought over by two opposing coalitions, 
liberal and conservative, each with relatively extreme views. Our 
middle-of-the-road voter is thus not some member of a "silent majority" 
desirous of some radical social change, but a moderate individual 
seeking to avoid the wide swings in policy engendered by our political 
system. In the environmental area, for example, we presume the middle­
of-the-road voter would like to see the EPA strike a more constant 
posture, somewhere between its relatively zealous activities pre-Reagan 
and its relatively lax actions in the current administration. 
Similarly, we suspect most citizens would prefer a federal education 
policy somewhere between the near total support for NEA positions found 
in the Carter years and the near total abandonment of a federal role 
under Reagan. 
How can we tell whether middle-of-the-road constituency 
interests are being represented? A traditional method has been to 
assemble a battery of such socioeconomic measures as income, education, 
and race to see whether roll call voting was related to constituency 
variables.1 This method has several drawbacks, including the difficult 
2 
problem of accurately measuring a constituency's economic self-interest 
on a given issue. 
A more direct approach takes advantage of an implication of the 
notion that a legislator represents an interest of his or her 
constituency. If middle-of-the-road interests are consistently 
represented, then legislators from the same constituency ought to be 
similar ideologically and ought to vote alike. 
The U. S. Senate is a terrain de choix for applying this direct 
method since each state is represented by two senators. There would 
appear to be a very simple method for assessing whether two senators 
represented a common interest. Take all the roll call votes for a 
given session of the Senate and compute the percentage of votes for 
which the pair did not vote alike. If a common constituency interest 
is being represented, presumably the two senators from a state will 
almost n. vote differently. They certainly should have less 
disagreement with each other than they have, on average, with other 
members of the Senate. 
Unfortunately, looking at disagreement percentages has a flaw. 
Consider two states, one with a very liberal senator and a moderate 
liberal senator, the other with a moderate conservative senator and a 
very conservative senator. What if there are a series of votes on, 
say, voting rights, that basically divide moderate conservatives from 
more extreme ones? Then the two senators from the first state will 
vote together while the two from the second state will split. While 
each pair of senators has about the same ideological separation, one 
pair agreed, the other disagreed. This illustrates how the 
disagreement percentage depends not just on intrinsic differences 
between the senators but on the content of the bills coming before a 
given session of the Senate. 2 
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To find this intrinsic policy difference or distance between 
two senators, we instead start with direct measures of distance. Each 
year, some 30 interest groups in Washington rate Senators. The groups 
include COPE, ACU, ADA, UAW, etc. The ratings give us a measure of the 
distance between the interest group and the senator. A high rating is 
low distance, and a low rating is high distance. Via the technique of 
least squares unfolding, we can use these distances to place both the 
interest groups and the senators on a liberal-conservative scale. We 
have scaled all 22 sessions of Congress from 1959 through 1980 using 
this method. Scale values for the Senators generally range from near 
-1 for extreme liberals (e. g. , Ted Kennedy) to +l for extreme 
conservatives (e. g. , Jesse Helms). The liberal-conservative placements 
accurately reproduce the original ratings. 3 
We have reason to believe that our procedure is very robust. 
For 1979 and 1980, we tried an entirely different scaling procedure, 
one based solely on the recorded roll call vote data (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1983). This procedure recovered liberal-conservative 
locations for the senators virtually identical to those obtained from 
the interest group ratings. The alternative technique is based on a 
probabilistic model of roll-call voting; its "predictions" are 
correct on 80 percent of the individual votes in the Senate. In 
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addition, we again recovered similar liberal-conservative positions 
when using a much cruder least squares decomposition (Poole, 1983) of 
the roll call votes. We thus conclude that we are accurately capturing 
liberal-conservative positions in the Senate and that these positions 
represent the major and far dominant factor underlying roll call voting 
behavior. 
In discarding disagreement percentages and favoring liberal­
conservative positions, we maintain the basic comparative technique. 
For middle-of-the-road representation, it is necessary (but not 
sufficient!) that senators from the same state should be close to each 
other on the liberal-conservative scale. 4 
Obviously where the middle-of-the-road proposition is most 
likely to be challenged is when one senator is a Democrat and the other 
is a Republican. From 1977 through 1982, California was represented by 
Alan Cranston, a very liberal senator, and Sam Hayakawa, a very 
conservative one. This ideological separation is not unusual for 
California. Hayakawa's seat had previously been held by Tunney, a 
liberal. Tunney was preceeded by the very conservative Murphy. Before 
Tunney, a six year term was served by the liberals Engle and Salinger. 
They were preceeded by an arch conservative, William Knowland, The 
California example is obviously very damaging to the case of middle-of­
the-road democracy. The only question is whether California is typical 
of the entire nation. 
To study this question, we began by dividing the states into 
three types, as shown in Figure 1. There are states with two 
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Republican senators, states with two Democrats and states with mixed 
delegations.5 The number of mixed states has steadily risen, 
reflecting in part the collapse of the Solid South. By 1980, one-half 
the states were mixed. 
If the opposing party coalitions were evenly balanced in every 
state, so that we had a fully competitive Senate, then the long-run 
probability that any seat is won by either one of the two parties would 
be one-half. (We say "long run" because we don't want to rule out 
scandal, incumbency, and other factors giving a short run bias to one 
party for specific seats or specific years. ) When full competition 
prevails, one expects, on average, 50 percent of the states to be 
represented by mixed delegations, 25 percent to have homogeneous 
Republican delegations, and 25 percent to have homogeneous Democrat 
delegations.6 Historically, the composition of the Senate was not 
consistent with this competitive model. Examination of the data for 
the period between 1912 and 1959 discloses that mixed delegations were 
always far less than 50 percent of the total. At the beginning of our 
liberal-conservative time-series, in 1959, with the Democrats in 
control, there were still only 16 mixed delegations, and there was less 
than one chance in one thousand that the observed distribution would 
arise under the null hypothesis of full competition. But, after 1980, 
when the distribution is very close to the expected 50-25-25, the 
chances are better than nine in ten. The current distribution of 
delegations is consistent with our claim of intense competition between 
opposing ideological coalitions. 
Now, our basic aim is to assess the ideological similarity of 
senators from a given state. To do this, we have to know something 
about the variability in positions of all senators. This variability 
can be captured in the measure of variance in liberal-conservative 
positions. 
Formally, one can't compare variances from separate scalings. 
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Moreover, the substantive nature of the bills and issues that fall 
along this issue change from year-to-year. Perhaps the basic content 
of "liberal" and "conservative" also change. Such changes are not 
central to our analysis, which is concerned with whether polarization 
occurs on whatever issues are currently relevant. To place the 
scalings in a common frame of reference that is appropriate for our 
purposes, we first carried out a linear transformation of each scale. 7 
The coefficients of these transformations and liberal-
conservative coordinates for a combined scale were chosen to minimize 
the sum of squared errors between the combined scale and the original 
scales. This technique essentially assumes that the liberal­
conservative positions of individual Senators are stable in time. Thus, 
variations in the liberal-conservative makeup of the Senate would arise 
mainly through changes in membership (Stone, 1977; cited by Kulinski, 
1979; and Clausen, 1973). 
The results of the combined scale are consistent with this view 
of stability. The combined scale correlates very highly with each of 
the yearly scales. 8 The results below are based on the transformed 
yearly scales. 
For the entire Senate, the variance is plotted in Figure 2 .  
The variance exhibits no long-term trends. There is a slight dip 
during the Great Society, peaks during Vietnam and Watergate, but 
values in the last three years are very close to those of the first 
three years. Basically, throughout the past two decades, there is a 
polarized distribution in the Senate, with liberal and conservative 
clusters and relatively few moderates in the Center. A typical 
Histogram are shown in Figure 3 for six of our twenty-two years. The 
plot of the variance shows that we will be concerned with a basic 
pattern of representation, one prevalent throughout the period, 
7 
Below the plot of the variance, Figure 2 also shows the 
percentage of the variance that is "explained" by separating the 
senators into the three types of states. This series is unit-free, and 
has no year-to-year comparison problems. Again, there are no long-term 
trends, although there is a dip that bottoms out at the height of the 
Vietnam controversy. The important finding is that the state types 
account for little of the ideological variability in the Senate. The 
percentage averages about 10; only once does it pass, barely, 20. 
A key factor in the small percentage of the variance explained 
by separating the states by type is that mixed state senators don't 
behave alike but, to some degree, behave like Democrats and 
Republicans. Indeed, Figure 2 also shows that if we separate by party 
instead of by state type we explain more of the variance and that party 
has become more important in recent years (largely because of the 
lesser weight of Southern conservatives among the Democrats ) . But
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party itself never explains as much as half the variance. Most of the 
variability in senatorial alignments cannot be explained by party 
affiliation but must be explained by variations between and within 
state delegations. 
Comparison of the within state variation to the between state 
variation is the central element in our argument. First, however, we 
pause to consider the total variation for each type relative to the 
total variation for the Senate, as plotted in Figure 4. If a delegation 
type was as heterogeneous as the Senate as a whole, its own variance 
would be 100 percent of the variance of the full Senate. A totally 
homogeneous type, with all its senators at a single value on the scale, 
would be at 0 percent. 
Democrat and Republican states are, as expected, more 
homogeneous than the Senate as a whole. Undoubtedly because of the 
presence of Southern conservatives, the Democrats were initially not 
very homogeneous. Until Nixon's second term, their variance was 
generally between 80 percent and 100 percent of the full Senate's. The 
Republicans were initially more homogeneous, being around 40 percent of 
the full Senate. But the Senatorial party was clearly badly split 
during Watergate, the Republican figure actually exceeding 100 percent 
in 1974 and 1975. Carter's presidency was needed to reunify the party. 
Under Carter, the two parties looked very similar in their 
degree of heterogeneity, confirming our position on two competitively 
similar opposing coalitions, Although the Democrat and Republican 
types are more homogeneous than the full Senate, they still exhibit 
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substantial diversity in liberal-conservative positions, the percentage 
for both types hovering near SO percent during the Carter years. 
In turn, the mixed delegations are far more heterogeneous than 
the one party delegations. They indeed tend to be slightly more 
heterogeneous than the Senate as a whole, since their percentage, 
which exhibits little temporal variation, oscillates between 100 
percent and 120 percent. 
The heterogeneity of mixed delegations need not have occurred. 
If homogeneous Republican states were "conservative" states, 
homogeneous Democrat, "liberal, " and mixed, "moderate, " the mixed 
delegations could have been as homogeneous as the one party 
delegations. Instead, the heterogeneity of mixed delegations suggests 
that these states are far from moderate in their representation. 
We now turn to the analysis of the heterogeneity in mixed and 
in one party types. The total variance for a type equals the variance 
within states plus the variance between states. If both Senators from 
a given state represent the same constituency interest, the within 
state variance should be quite small. The heterogeneity within a type 
should be explicable by the varying interests of the states. 
Indeed, the Democrat and Republican types witness consistent 
interest representation. For the Democrats, within state variance is 
perennially extremely small, about 10 percent of the total type 
variance ( see Figure 5), For the Republicans, it is only slightly 
larger, with the exception of two peaks; one in 1965 and 1966, the 
other from 1971 through 1976. Even at the peaks, however, within state 
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variance is always less than between state variance. One of the peaks 
is largely explicable and is truly the exception that proves the rule. 
In the 1970 Senatorial elections in New York, our model of !.!!Q. opposing 
coalitions broke down. A triangular contest saw the election of James 
Buckley, a conservative, while New York's other Republican Senator, 
Jacob Javits, remained the most liberal Republican member of the 
Senate. Political observers correctly predicted that Buckley's deviant 
behavior as a Senator would not survive one term. Deleting New York 
from the analysis for the Buckley years dampens the peak considerably. 
(Again, see Figure 5. ) Since Buckley's departure in 1976, the 
Republican and Democrat types have closely resembled each other. 
After controlling for party, we find important and similar 
residual variation over one party states, This residual variation is 
overwhelmingly the result of variation across states and only slightly 
reflects variation between Senators from the same state. 
Senate watchers have in fact suggested to us that Senators from 
the same party and state actively consult each other prior to voting. 
They are thus likely to represent the views of their support coalitions 
rather than their personal ideological views. 
Are the support coalitions representative of middle-of-the-road 
citizens? The data for mixed states argues strongly that the Democrat 
and Republican support coalitions in each state represent relatively 
extreme views. The two senators from a mixed state don't adopt anything 
near common positions. The within state variance percentage in this 
type always substantially exceeds that for the Republican and Democrat 
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types and is generally over 50 percent of the total. That is, there 
are generally more differences internal to each state than between the 
various states. State interests are less important than the support 
coalition interests within each state.9 
The same story is told in slightly different form in Figure 6. 
There we have plotted a within-state standard deviation (the square 
root of the variance) band for each type. That is, each band shows the 
variation we would expect if all senators for a type came from an 
"average" state for that type and exhibited only within-state 
variation. Bands for the homogeneous Democrat and Republican types are 
narrow and generally well separated. They overlap only briefly and 
slightly for three of the Vietnam years. In contrast, the mixed state 
band is very large, usually covering all of the Democrat band and much 
of the Republican band. 
These results argue strongly that while constituency interests 
are represented in Congress, the interests are mainly those of 
relatively extreme support coalitions rather than those of the 
constituency as a whole as represented by its middle-of-the-road voter. 
Some indication that support coalition interests may be abating 
in favor of general constituency interests is found in Figure 5, which 
shows that the importance of within-state variation in mixed states has 
undergone a secular decline, falling from the 70-80 percent range found 
up to 1965 to a 50-60 percent range found after 1973. Such a fall 
would be consis ten t with the increased emphasis on case work and home 
office staffs found in recent years (Fiorina, 1978). Yet the fall is 
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largely offset by another phenomenon, the increasing polarization of 
the underlying support coalitions. This is seen in Figure 7, where we 
have plotted Republican and Democrat type one standard deviation bands 
for the total type variance. A similar story is told by Figure 8, 
where the plots concern all Senators and not just those from one party 
delegations. Pre-Vietnam party positions were fairly polarized, and 
there was only moderate overlap of the bands. With Vietnam party lines 
became blurred, and there was a very substantial overlap. Since 1975, 
however, party separation has been greater than ever, largely 
occasioned by a secular liberal drift of the Democrats. The overlap is 
now smaller than it has ever been (since 1959). So while senators may 
be slightly less prone to vote their support coalition's interests, 
when they do so, those interests are more polarized than ever. 
Why are general constituency interests so often sacrificed to 
those of support coalitions? Our interest group ratings th!!lllselves 
tell much of the story. In our liberal-conservative scaling, most of 
the interest groups turn out to be more extreme than most of the 
senators (Poole, 1981). Groups with moderate views don't get involved 
in politics. Candidates in turn need people willing to contribute 
money and ring doorbells. While some competitive pressures may push 
them to the center, the need for resources retains them at the 
extremes. Although candidates might win votes by moving to the outer, 
a centrist position will generally leave them without enough resources 
for an effective campaign. In addition, a centrist position may spell 
doom in primary elections (Wright, 1978). 
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We indicated at the outset that we expect our analysis to apply 
far beyond the Senate. The Presidential analog of the story is 
typified by our EPA and education examples. At the state level, we 
could continue to look at California, appealing to the Brown-Reagan­
Brown-Deukmej ian shuffling at the gubernatorial level. Rather than a 
continual adjustment of middle-of-the-road policies, there are 
relatively rapid swings in the policy preferences of elected 
representatives and executives. 
At first glance, the House of Representatives appears somewhat 
different. On the one hand, our results are similar to those of 
Fiorina (1974), who compared changes in a constituency's roll call 
behavior when the seat changed parties. Yet the key observation about 
the House is not that party makes a difference in how the 
constituency's representative votes, but that so few seats change 
party. We have a bountiful literature on vanishing marginals, 
declining competition, and the incumbency advantage. The House seems 
very different from our fully competitive Senate. 
To some degree the difference is more apparent than real. When 
we talked about the Senate as being fully competitive, we spoke of 
long-term probabilities, Indeed, incumbency has obvious advantages in 
the Senate also. Despite a major recession, the Senate's delegation 
composition barely budged in the 19 82 elections. Senate seats then 
look more competitive than the House, to some degree, because of the 
election of two members per constituency. Certainly, if the House had 
two member constituencies, we could also expect large numbers of mixed 
14 
delegations. 
However, the difference is a real one to the extent that 
gerrymandering creates homogeneous House districts (Cain, forthcoming). 
In homogeneous, farming, suburban, or black districts, for example, 
middle-of-the-road constituency interests are almost trivially 
represented. But instead of a polarization of support groups within 
constituencies, as in the Senate, the House would then have a 
polarization of constituencies. Representatives are still likely to 
exhibit policy preferences that are extreme relative to national 
averages. In fact, histograms for the House similar to Figure 3 
indicate that the liberal-conservative distribution in the House is far 
more polarized than in the Senate (Poole and Daniels, 1982), Since 
spatial analysis of policy preferences often (e. g. , Rabinowitz, 1978; 
Poole and Rosenthal, 1982) disclose a unimodal distribution in the mass 
public, the polarized distribution of elected representatives 
and interest groups represents a curious form of representation. 
We are sufficiently sophisticated students of social choice to 
make no normative case for middle-of-the-road representation over 
support coalition representation. We do point out that alternation in 
power among support coalitions imposes considerable costs. In the last 
months of the Brown administration in California, the state initiated 
commuter rail service between Oxnard and Los Angeles. Shortly after 
Deukmejian took office, the service was abandoned. While it is 
uncertain whether abandonment was preferable to continuing the service, 
never starting the service at all would clearly dominate the actual 
policy sequence. Unfortunately, the costs of ping-panging may be 
inevitable in a plurality democracy.IO 
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FOOTNOTES 
* The work reported here would not have been undertaken had our 
interest in constituency representation not been stimulated by 
conversations with Rod Kiewiet and Thomas Romer. We also thank 
Bruce Cain for comments. Errors remain our responsibility. 
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1 .  For a detailed review of this literature, see Fiorina (1974). See 
also Kulinski (1979). 
2. For a formal discussion of this point, see Morrison (1972). 
3. For a detailed description of the scaling, see Poole (1981).
4. Related research on the House, to be discussed later, is found in
Fiorina (1974). Subsequent to the initial draft of this paper, we 
discovered the work of Bullock and Brady (1983), who used a 
methodology virtually identical to ours with similar results. 
There are several differences between our work and theirs. (1) We 
treat 22 years rather than a single year. (2) Rather than using 
just two rating scales per year, we use a synthesis of over 50 
scales. Since the recovered positions "explain" all votes to 
about the same degree (Poole, 1981; Poole and Daniels, 1982; Poole 
and Ro senthal, 1983), we can no w claim that the Fiorina and 
Bullock-Brady type of results are robust to the scales chosen for 
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analysis. (3) We preserve a distinction between homogeneous 
Democrat states and homogeneous Republican states. This 
distinction proves relevant in the analysis. On the other hand, 
Bullock and Brady's paper is more ambitious than ours in the sense 
that they attempt to explicate these findings in terms of the 
heterogeneity of states. 
5. The number of cases in each type is obviously small. 
Consequently, readers are urged to look at trends over several
years in the figures in this paper and not to focus on results for
individual years. In developing the types, we made the following 
decisions. Strom Thurmond switched from Democrat to Republican in 
1964. We classified him as a Democrat prior to 1964, as a 
Republican after 1964, and discarded South Carolina from the 
analysis in 1964, explaining the presence of only 49 states in 
that year. In addition, Harry Byrd, Jr. of Virginia left the 
Democrats in 1970 to become an independent. Virginia has been 
discarded from the analysis from 1970 through 1980. In addition, 
it was necessary to discard South Dakota (except for Figure 1) in 
1972 because Karl Mundt had no recorded votes for that year. Had 
Mundt voted, our results would have been reinforced since South 
Dakota's other senator was the highly liberal George McGovern. 
6. Th i s  point is ignored by Bullock and Brady (1983) who use the 
presence of a mixed delegation in a state as a measure of 
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competitiveness in their path analysis. But such a measure is 
biased, since, in a fully competitive world, one party delegations 
will arise as frequently as mixed ones. A Senate with all 
delegations mixed would not be consistent with competition but 
with some other model, such as duopoly sharing of sests. 
7. We used the procedure of Poole (1983), which generalizes the
Eckart-Young (1936) matrix approximation method to allow for
missing data. 
8. Squared correlations between individual years and the combined 
scales range from 0. 88 to 0. 97. Results reported in this paper 
are virtually identical to those obtained using the untransformed 
scales. In fact, the linear transformations show little variation 
across years. Nonetheless, results such as the variance plot in 
Figure 2 do not follow automatically from this year-to-year 
stability. Since the correlations are computed for the members of
the Senate in a given year, variances, etc. could vary across 
years because of changes in the Senate's membership. 
9. This argument has been made by Huntington (1950); Fiorina (1974);
and Fenno (1977). 
10. Lijphart (1977) has previously suggested that plurality, two party 
systems typified by Britain and the United States may be more
19 
subject to wide policy swings than multi-party proportional 
systems typified by the Netherlands and Switzerland. He gives the 
nationalization -- denationalization cycles of the British steel 
industry as an example of how ping-ponging may be more costly than 
a consistent policy. 
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± One Standard Deviation Bands for Total Type Variance 
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Figure 8 
± One Standard Deviation Bands for All Party Members 
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